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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF 'THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD H. HOLDER, 
Respondent and Plaintiff) 
-vs.-
RUTH M. HOLDER, 
Appellant and Defendant. 
Case 
No. 8984 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant will not take specific exception to plain-
tiff's summary of the facts in his brief other than to note 
that the conclusion he urges drawn from those stated 
are entirely speculative as to the crucial issue a::-; to 
whether defendant was pregnant prior to being with 
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plaintiff again and having intercourse on December 24, 
1956. He relies heavily on the dependability of such 
speculation by referring to a remark of Dr. Holbrook in a 
deposition concerning the degree of possibility requested 
(R. 57). l-Iowever, it is evident frmn reading this in con-
text that Dr. Holbrook did not mean to be understood 
as giving any reliable estimate as to the statistical possi-
bility of this child being conceived on the date in question 
and certainly not one chance in 10,000, as plaintiff now 
argues. (R. 59, 60) 
STATEMENT OF POIKTS 
POINT I 
THE CHILD IN QUESTION WAS A "NEAR TERM" 
BABY, NOT A "FULL TERM" BABY. 
POINT II 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE IS THAT 
DEFENDANT DID NOT MAKE THE ADMISSIONS REFER-
RED TO IN POINT II OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS NOT CONCLUSIVE THAT DE-
FENDANT MUST HAVE BEEN PREGNANT ON DECEMBER 
24, 1956. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
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ARG UJ\1:ENT 
POINT I 
THE CHILD IN QUESTION WAS A "NEAR TERM" 
BABY, NOT A "FULL TERM" BABY. 
Plaintiff in his brief impliedly conceeds that the evi-
dence does not support Finding of Fact No. 8 as he makes 
the tern1 in the alternative and thus at variance with the 
finding of the trial court on this point. 
POINT II 
'THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE IS THAT 
DEFENDANT DID NOT MAKE THE ADMISSIONS REFER-
RED TO IN POINT II OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF. 
Since this case is one in equity, this Honorable Court 
IS not bound to accept plaintiff's parents' testimony as 
true because of the lower court's Findings of Fact No. 9 
and No. 10. Again it should be remembered that the only 
important admission of the two was not even mentioned 
in the Memorandum Decision which was prepared by the 
trial judge (R. 106). Defendant's testimony, which is 
based on direct evidence and not admissible hearsay, was 
a complete denial of such admission, and she is supported 
entirely in this by the only other person having actual 
knowledge thereof, namely Dr. Trowbridge, a party di::;-
interested in the results of this lawsuit (R. 117). 
It is significant that plaintiff's brief makes no rebut-
tal at all to defendant's contention that such admission 
would be so contrary with the normal pattern of conduct 
9 
.v 
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that testimony as to its occurrence is not worthy of belief, 
at least where reliable evidence is to the contrary. Plain-
tiff fails to point out wherein or why such admission is 
compatible with any conduct that could be expected of 
one In such a situation as he contends defendant was in. 
rrhe conduct of defendant referred to by plaintiff is en-
tirely prior to and unrelated to the important admission 
in question. He states that the record is "filled with evi-
uence" that the defendant began to claim she was preg-
nant on December 25, 1956, and infers that this is based 
on admissions of defendant in her testimony, but he fails 
to state wherein the record such is to be found and appel-
lant submits that the same is found only in the self-
~erving testimony of plaintiff or his parents. 
Appellant objects to the inference that Dr. Trow-
bridge's affidavit was doctored up after he signed it. This 
is not so. The alteration was requested by the doctor 
and appellant's counsel considers the affidavit as origin-
ally pre~ented just as effective and can not see how such 
alteration increases its potency any. 
It is ('<•rtainly a JWil L-..'C(juitor that plaintiff's mother 
<'oulrl not have known about defendant's visit to Dr. 
Trowbridge absence any adlnission about consulting him 
n>~rarrlino· }lre2'naneY. In Yie"· of defendanfs illness on n ~~ L-' • 
the trip to Ca1ifornia, it would be quite natural to state 
that siH' had eonsulted with Dr. Trowbridge regarding 
lwr fln. J)pfnndnnt denied having the conversation re-
In ted h~· pin inti ff'~ nwther. not that she ever had a con-
i 
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versation regarding consulting with Dr. Trowbridge be-
fore her trip about a flu illness. 
While it would have been possible for defendant to 
have called Dr. Trowbridge as a rebuttal witness, that 
would hardly seem to be necessary in view of the well 
settled presumption of the law that evidence which is 
available to a party who would normally be expected to 
produce such evidence if favorable would be adverse if 
produced upon the failure of such party to produce that 
evidence. Plaintiff has the burden of proving pregnancy 
prior to his first applicable intercourse and Dr. Trow-
bridge's testimony would have been vital, if not conclu-
sive, in proving that if defendant had made the admis-
sion testified to by plaintiff's mother. Appellant ought 
not to be required to prove the negative after demanding 
that plaintiff produce such evidence if it proved the fact 
·:e contended for. In any event, where the presumption 
is proved to be correct, as here, such evidence ought to 
be considered in determining whether the opposite was 
true or not. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE I.S NOT CONCLUSIVE THAT DE-
FENDANT MUST HAVE BEEN PREGNANT ON DECEMBER 
24, 1956. 
Plaintiff contends that the following iterns of evi-
dence which are italicized conclusively prove plaintiff's 
case. Appellant contends that they do not. ApparPntly 
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this appeal rnust stand or fall on this point. If any of 
these eight items proved this conclusively, as plaintiff 
rnust do to sustain his decree in the lower court according 
to the authorities cited hereinafter, the other seven would 
not be needed. If none do so· per se, then the collection 
cannot do so because it could only strengthen the statisti-
cal probability that the speculation urged by plaintiff is 
a correct one. 
1. Dr. 11 olbrook' s estimate that baby would be born in 
middle of August. 
This certainly is not conclusive. This can only be 
accepted for what it is - an estimate. Even Dr. Hol-
brook does not appear to have been very sure that the 
baby was going to be born when she was in view of the 
fact that doctors normally see patients weekly during 
the last month of pregnancy and this baby was born be-
tween appoinhnents three weeks apart (R. 63, 64). 
·> According to plaintiffs father, defendant expressed 
an intent to become pregnant before be-ing w·ith pla.in-
tiff. 
Not only is this inconclusive but, if true, would tend 
to prove plaintiff is the father. Since this was covered 
in s01ne detail on pages 4 and 5 of appellant's brief, it will 
not be repeated here except to note !hat respondent failed 
to malw an~· rebuttal at all to appellant's argmnent that 
:-;twh <'OIHhl<'t \ra~ improbable and incredible. 
6 
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3. According to plaintiff's mother, defendant admitted 
contacting a doctor relati·ve to missing a menstntal 
period. 
If true, this could be considered conclusive, but Dr. 
Trowbridge's affidavit (R. 117) proves it is not true. It 
is well to bear in mind the fact that plaintiff had resolverl 
to terminate the marriage immediately following the 
baby's birth (R. 81) and this was known to plaintiff's 
parents (R. 81). Thus the alleged conversation took place 
at a time plaintiff and his parents were preparing for 
trial. Plaintiff's argument that plaintiff's mother could 
not have known about defendant contacting (this was a 
call not a visit as respondent calls its-see R. 25) Dr. 
Trowbridge if no conversation betwen them about it had 
taken place is sound as far as it goes but it certainly does 
not go to the point of proving or even raising an inference 
that this contact related to possible pregnancy. In fact, 
investigation by plaintiff's parents before trial deter-
mined that this was not the purpose for which defendant 
contacted Dr. Trowbridge and this is why plaintiff did not 
call this doctor as a witness (R. 117). 
There is a well established presumption in law that 
a party will produce evidence which is favorable to hin1 
if such evidence exists and is available. Jones on Evi-
dence, Ct'vil Cases (4th Ed.) P 49, says : 
"The mere withholding or failing to produce 
material evidence which is available and would, in 
the circumstances of the case, be expected to be 
7 
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produced, gives rise to a natural inference - less 
forceful than that arising from the destruction, 
fabrication, or suppression of evidence in which 
other parties have a legal interest but" constantly 
acted upon by the courts- that such evidence is 
held back because it would be unfavorable or ad-
verse to the party withholding it." (citing 15 cases 
to this effect.) 
The instant case proves the wisdom of such a pre-
sumption. Appellant ought not to be precluded from es-
tablishing the real facts through Dr. Trowbridge because 
of reliance on that presumption, particularly after mak- · 
ing demand upon respondent for the production of such 
evidence if favorable when the ·witness to the contrary 
would have a natural prejudice. 
4. According to plaintiff, defendant claimed she was 
pregnant on December 25th. 
How conclusive \vould that bel Again plaintiff seek8 
to prove a case against defendant by attributing state-
lnents to her which defendant denies. Even if it were 
so, it would be only a prognastication which subsequent 
develop1nents proved to be correct . 
• >. Defendant fa~led to tell plaZ:.ntiff of Dr. Holbrook's 
prediction as to 1chell the baby tcould be born. 
\Vhat i~ unnatural about that1 Does it tend to prove 
d<>l'<>n<lant guilt~· of ilnproper conduct that she did not 
rai~e ~u~pieion~ in her husband's n1ind based on refusal 
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of some people to accept the exceptions to the average 
period of gestation~ 
G. Defendant took a pregnancy test on January 7th, 
two weeks following her intercourse with plaintiff. 
Was that unnatural since it was then 43 days since 
her last period, much longer than even her irregular peri-
ods, and she had good cause to suspect she Inight be 
pregnant due to relations with plaintiff~ 
7. Freem(})n test normally does not determine pregnancy 
within the period in question. 
This is not conclusive. The evidence did not estab-
lish how unusual this was but even if this is rare, it hard-
ly does more than show this was an exceptional case. An 
exceptional baby, however, is entitled to the same pro-
tection of legitimacy as one within the statistically 1nore 
common range. 
8. Defendant admitted being sick or nattseated on the 
way to Californva. 
Does that prove morning sickness~ If it did, there 
would be more babies than there are and some born to the 
wrong sex. It is uncontradicted that there was flu in 
defendant's family at the time, that she had called Dr. 
Trowbridge about treatment for flu and that she had 
missed school a few days before the trip because of it. 
Some people becon1e car sick without other illnes8. rl\> 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conclude this was nwrning sickness is speculation of the 
rankest sort. 
None of the authorities cited by respondent in his 
brief provide a precedent for finding a child born under 
the circumstances of this case to be illegitimate. Appellant 
does not take issue with the extract from Estate of JJfc-
N a mara, 181 Cal. 82, 183 (P) 552, 7 ALR 313, to the ef-
fect that the presumption can not be conclusive in ex-
treme and exceptional cases (cited in respondent's brief 
on page 12). Reference to the facts in that case set 
forth in Gonzales v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 202 P. 
(2d) 135, at page 138 shmYs that in there the n1other 
of the child left her husband on December 23, 1913, and 
immediately went to live with one McXamara. She lived 
with hiin until his death in :Jlay 1916: The child was born 
October 24, 1914, 304. days· after the "ife had left her 
husband. The evidence there was that prolonged preg-
nancies up to 300 days are possible but unusual. There, 
unlike here, it \Yas undisputed that another possible 
father wa~ involved. It is also well to ren1ember that the 
interesbs of the ehild in question there were served by 
! incling hiin an issue of the decedent. The problem in 
tll<> Gonzales l'. Pacific Greyhound Lines (supra). from 
"·h ieh that extraet was taken was to detennine whether 
or not :234 days was such an unusually short pregnancy 
period a~ to take it out of the eategor~~ of a conclusiYe 
pr<>:-llllllption and make it rebut~le. The court there 
round it wa:-~ not so unusual and applied the conclusiYe 
10 
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presumption. There is no intimation in that case that 
the two shorter days here would have altered the holding, 
particularly since the court there cited with approval the 
case of Dazey v. D.azey, 50 Cal. (2d) 15, 122 P. 2nd 308, 
which applied the conclusive presumption in a pregnancy 
of 225 days and in which case the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia denied a hearing without a dissenting vote. 
In the case of JI!Jrurr v. Murr, 197 P 2nd 369, a decision 
of the 2nd District Court of Appeals of the State of Cali-
fornia, cited by respondent, it was held that the presump-
tion of legitimacy of a child born 190 days after earliest 
possible fruitful coitus with husband was rebuttable 
and reversed the judgment of the trial court who held 
the presumption to be conclusive and granted the husband 
a new trial. Even there the court did not conclude as a 
matter of law that the child could not have been the law-
ful issue of the husband despite the fact that the decision 
refers to testimony of unrelated witnesses to the effect 
that the mother was seen in the company of another man, 
was seen kissing him and was indecently exposed. Under 
those facts, appellant takes no issue with the quotation 
from it cited by respondent. 
It is true that the parties were not husband and wife 
at the time the first intercourse took place, but the over-
whelming weight of authority in the United States applies 
the presumption in case of premarital intercourse as well, 
although some jurisdictions require less evidence to over-
11 
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come the presumption in such cases than otherwise (57 
ALR 2nd 729). 
Cases are collected in 57 ALR ( 2d) 729 under section 
(f) on Page 7 42 which deal with what proof is necessary 
to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. There the case 
of Needham v. Needham, 299 SW 832 C~Iissouri) is 
<1uoted as follows: 
"The rnodern doctrine undoubtedly is that 
the presumption -of legitimacy arising from in 
wedlock may be overthrown by any competent and 
relative evidence disclosing that the husband could 
not have been the father of the child." 
This has been established by sho1Vwg that the husband 
was entirely absent so as to have had no intercourse with 
the 1nother. In Eldridge r. Eldridge (1944) 153 Fla. 873, 
16 So. 2nd 163, it was held that evidence that the child 
there was born 226 days after the first meeting of the 
husband and wife, and it appearing from two days after 
their first meeting and until their 1narriage some three 
weeks later the husband engaged in frequent acts of 
intercourse with the 1nother, and the 1nedical testin10ny 
disclosed that the nonnal period of gestation is :2SO days 
and that after the 190 days a child has a fair chance to 
I ive \nt~ held insufficient to oYere01ne the presu1nption. 
1 Our case except 6 days longer period in this one.) :Jiany 
<·a:-;p~ have declared that the part~~ assailing the child's 
lq.?;itimacy lla~ the burden of proving beyond all reason-
able doubt tlwt tJw husband wa8 not the father of the 
12 
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child. Gross v. Gross (1953 Ky.) 260 S.W. 2nd 655, Phil-
lips v. Allen (1861) 84 :Mass. (2 Allen) 453, Second;ine 
v. Secondine, (1957 Okla.) 311 P. 2d 215, Vorvilas v. 
V orvilas ( 1948) 252 Wis. 333, 31 NvV 2nd 586 and l'rf ader 
c. Nlader ( 1950) 258 Vilis. 117, 44 NW 2nd 924. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Argument under prior points, which will not be re-
peated here, establishes the error in the lower court not 
considering the testilnony of Dr. rrrowbridge which re- · 
futed the main basis of plaintiff's case. It is evident, 
however, that his decision was not based on Findings 
of Fact No. 10 and he•, therefore, would have ruled as 
he did even if defendant had satisfied the court on a 
new trial that no such admission was made. If the other 
evidence does not conclusively prove that defendant was 
pregnant on December 24, 1956, and if the alleged admis-
sion could establish such proof, even when contradicted 
by this doctor, appellant respectfully submits that the 
testimony of Dr. Trowbridge on this point should be 
received in new trial. 
SUMMAHY 
The evidence did not conclusively establish that the 
child born August 13, 1957, was not the child of the plain-
tiff. The evidence did conclusively prove that the parties 
13 
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hereto had sexual intercourse at a time when by the lmrs 
of nature the plaintiff might be the father of the child 
in question. It must be conclusively presumed, therefore, 
that plaintiff is the father of this child. The annulment 
decree of the lower court should be vacated, the cause re-
manded to the District Court of Salt Lake County to as-
certain what alimony, support money, and counsel fee3, 
if any, plaintiff should pray and a decree of divorce 
granted to defendant accordingly. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT H. HAXSEX 
Attorney for Appellant 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
65 East 4th South 
14 
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